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Abstract. The article proposes a semiotic interpretation of the concept of bio-
politics. Instead of a politics that takes “life itself ” as its object and, as a result, 
separates life as an object from subjects, biopolitics is read as subjectification – a 
governmental rationality that constructs social ways of being and forms of life, 
that is, social subjectivities. The article articulates this position on the basis of two 
concepts: Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt and Michel Foucault’s dispositive. While the 
former makes it possible to show that the process of life can be conceptualized as 
subjectification, the latter enables us to argue against an interpretation of biopolitics 
as a totalized structure of power intervening directly, without semiotic mediation, 
into “life itself ”. 
Keywords: biopolitics; dispositive; umwelt; subject; Jakob von Uexküll; Michel 
Foucault
Introduction
This paper is an attempt to take a perspective on biopolitics that is slightly diffe-
rent from the customary. While biopolitics is commonly conceptualized as the 
reduction of human beings to a less-than-human condition to what is termed 
either ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998) or ‘sheer life’ (Arendt 1998[1958]), my purpose 
is to focus on subjectification in its double meaning: both the active and agential 
construction of subjectivity and subjection in the context of power relations. 
While problems of subjectivity and subjectification are not entirely absent from 
the theories of biopolitics, the principal focus of analysis is often on the separation 
of life from the subjects – on the process through which subjects can be turned 
into simple living objects to be managed and controlled, or, in the extreme, to be 
made entirely disposable. 
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 This focus has two consequences which are also the reasons why I am attempting 
to think of biopolitics on the basis of subjectification. The first is related to the 
understanding that biopolitics takes something as vague and indeterminate as 
“life itself ” as its object – either life at the molecular level (see Rose 2007) or the 
bodily life of humans-as-living beings separated from the latter and thus rendered 
incapable of any sort of freedom and meaning-making (see Agamben 1998). The 
consequence of this argument is that here the object of government (the governed) 
is no longer something that can be conceptualized in terms of agency: it is a mere 
living object – biosemiotically speaking, a contradiction. The second consequence 
is directly related both to the first question as well as to the following one: how is it 
possible to conceptualize resistance in the context of biopolitics if the life governed 
is separated from the subject and rendered into a passive, controllable process or 
an object? The answer is often sought in a completely new conceptualization of life 
that has, unfortunately, next to nothing to do with politics. This is, for example, 
Agamben’s strategy when he envisions a “form-of-life” that “can never be separated 
from its form” (Agamben 2016: 207) – a form of life that communicates only its 
(im)potentiality; a life lived in “non-relation” to power: an apolitical life.1 What 
resists is understood to be a life that now separates itself from political (inter)action. 
As a result, “life itself ” or “bare life” is given almost an ontological spontaneous 
capacity for resisting power: life, simply in its vital process, (re)producing itself, is 
that which cannot be subjected and which “does politics” spontaneously without a 
subject (see, for example, the concept of multitude in Hardt, Negri 2000; 2004).
 These two consequences are what I will attempt to overcome with a focus on 
subjectivity and subjectification in the context of biopolitics. This line of argu-
ment enables us to conceptualize biopolitics as politics, and not as a simple 
application of power over life.2 That is, if biopolitics is not viewed simply as a 
1 When Agamben thinks of politics beyond biopolitics, he posits a non-relational ontology 
in which living beings could not be reduced to their “relations”, but would matter in their 
very form of life: “It will [...] be necessary to think politics as an intimacy unmediated by 
any articulation or representation: human beings, forms-of-life are in contact, but this is 
unrepresentable because it consists precisely in a representative void, that is, in the deactivation 
and inoperativity of every representation” (Agamben 2016: 237). Agamben’s ambition is, then, 
certainly a utopian one of thinking a politics of everyday singular events of encounter without 
(representative) power. Th e aim of this article is, however, not to present a dilemma between 
political freedom and coercive power, but to articulate how power and politics always coexist 
and cannot be thought separately. For this purpose, speaking of a politics without power 
amounts to speaking of an apolitical politics.
2 Th is is not to say that Agamben does not attempt to think of a sort of “democratic biopolitics” 
(see Prozorov 2017), but rather that, for him, this would mean a total reconfi guration of what 
we mean by politics – as noted above, it would necessitate thinking of a politics without power.
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form of government that objectifies “life itself ”, but that constructs, constitutes 
and normalizes social subjectivity in its biological and bodily aspects, then we 
do not need to go to extra lengths in order to endow “life” with an ontological 
political potentiality. However, I do not wish to understand subjectivity here as 
something necessarily opposing or standing outside power relations. The point 
is to show that, instead, subjectivity can be understood to be both constructed 
in power relations and a site of resistance. The possibility of resistance, and thus 
of freedom of action, stems precisely from semiotic interaction in the context of 
power relations. 
 In order to articulate this point, I will employ two concepts that, at first glance, 
might seem rather distant from each other and attempt to relate these. The first 
of these is the dispositive  – first proposed by Michel Foucault (1980) and later 
developed, among others, by Gilles Deleuze (2006) and Giorgio Agamben (2009) – 
which signifies a network of heterogeneous elements deployed to some strategic 
ends. The dispositive is always related to power and the latter’s subjectifying 
dimension. As a most famous example, the Panopticon constructs its subjects as 
docile bodies (Foucault 1991[1975]). The second concept is Jakob von Uexküll’s 
(1957[1934]; 1982[1940]) umwelt, a subjective meaningful world through the 
construction of which living beings also become subjects of their own world. The 
concept of umwelt enables us to focus on subjectivity while not saying that biopolitics 
is not, in fact, importantly related to life, because based on Uexküll it is possible to 
say that the process of life is primarily an ongoing process of subjectification.
 Still, before we can turn to the concepts of the dispositive and umwelt, let 
us briefly consider Hannah Arendt’s and Giorgio Agamben’s understanding of 
biopolitics as a totalized and totalizing power in order to know better what it is we 
are opposing.
Hannah Arendt: The politicization of sheer life
Both Hannah Arendt,3 who attempted to understand the new post-World 
War II context within which Western people found themselves, and Giorgio 
Agamben, whose theory of biopolitics based on Foucault’s approach4 and on a 
reconceptualization of Carl Schmitt’s (2007[1932]) figure of the sovereign gained 
3 Although Arendt never uses the terms ‘biopolitics’ or ‘biopower’, her analysis of the intro-
duction of sheer life into modern politics is the reason why she is considered to be a “theorist 
of biopolitics avant la lèttre” (Braun 2007: 7).
4 It must be said, however, that Agamben shares much more with Arendt’s perspective than 
with Foucault’s (see Blencowe 2010), which is why they are also considered together in this paper.
108 Ott Puumeister
increased popularity in the wake of 9/11, conceptualize biopolitics as a form of 
totalized power of subjection. Although Arendt concentrates on the normalization 
of individuals’ behaviour and Agamben on the production of a biopolitical body 
exposed to sovereign violence, their argument springs from the same source – 
Aristotle’s (1995) view of politics as dealing with the good life as opposed to sheer 
life or life as such, the latter being excluded from the political and confined to the 
domestic sphere. Consequently, they articulate the problem in the same manner: 
political freedom of action becomes impossible when sheer life (zoē) becomes the 
basis for the constitution of a political life (bios).
 Let us begin by considering Arendt’s view. Her analysis of modern politics 
is informed by Aristotle’s distinction between sheer life and good life that is 
symmetrical with the division between oikos and polis, the private household and 
the public affairs of the city. Sheer life, belonging to the private household, deals 
with the realm of necessity, the satisfaction of everyday needs of human beings. 
Freedom becomes possible only in the public realm, in the polis. The implication 
here is that freedom of action becomes possible when one is free from concerns 
regarding biological needs:
Natural community in the household [...] was born of necessity, and necessity 
ruled over all activities performed in it. Th e realm of the polis, on the contrary, was 
the sphere of freedom, and if there was a relationship between these two spheres, it 
was a matter of course that the mastering of the necessities of life in the household 
was the condition for freedom of the polis. (Arendt 1998: 30–31)
Thus, politics, conceptualized along Aristotelian lines as the association of free 
citizens based on logos, reason and language, cannot involve concerns for the 
biological aspects of life. The good life does not refer to biological life, it is “‘good’ 
to the extent that by having mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed 
from labor and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for 
their own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process” (Arendt 
1998: 37).
 Now, modernity, according to Arendt, introduces the biological life process 
and necessity into politics. Modern society can thus be understood as an enlarged 
household in which sheer life becomes a predominant concern. Politics is, 
consequently, transformed into management and administration of (biological) 
necessities that precludes any possibility of creative political action and human 
beings are relegated to normalized behavior (Arendt 1998: 40). In the words 
of Hanna Pitkin (2000: 181), behaviour and action can be distinguished in the 
following manner: 
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Behaviour is rule-governed, obedient, conventional, uniform, and status-oriented; 
action, by contrast, is spontaneous and creative; it involves judging and possibly 
reversing goals, norms, and standards rather than accepting them as given. 
Behaviour is routine, action unpredictable, even heroic. 
With politics transformed into normalization of behaviour, human beings are 
transformed into labouring animals  – animal laborans as opposed to homo 
faber (see Arendt 1998: 144–159) – whose sole function is to reproduce sheer 
life. Arendtian biopolitics understands subjects to be wholly subjected to the 
normalizing power of society, with the only potentiality for freedom of action 
understood to stem from mastering the necessities of life and relegating them from 
politics altogether. Freedom and biopolitics cannot be thought together, since, for 
Arendt, “there is not an ounce of matter in human action” (Lazzarato 2014: 28).
Giorgio Agamben: The production of bare life
Agamben’s argument is similar to Arendt’s. Agamben, too, begins his Homo Sacer. 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) with the Aristotelian distinction between 
zoē and bios, life common to all living beings and a politically qualified life of 
a certain collective of living (human) beings. However, Agamben’s argument 
introduces us to a term signifying a specifically biopolitical product – ‘bare life’. It 
is important to note that for Agamben, zoē is already a biopolitical distinction: life 
excluded from the political sphere and posited as the ground from which human 
politics becomes possible. Thus, when Agamben speaks of zoē, he is dealing with a 
political concept and not with the notion of life common to all living beings: “[I]in 
Western culture ‘life’ is not a medical-scientific notion but a philosophico-political 
concept” (Agamben 2016: 195).5
 Bare life is thus that which is separated from political life. This inclusive 
exclusion of bare life marks, for Agamben, a structure of biopolitics which makes 
it possible to reduce human beings to simple living objects, that is to say, to life 
that is stripped of all rights and exposed to sovereign violence. Similarly to Arendt, 
Agamben’s main concern is to show how the inclusion of bare life into politics 
5 Th is interpretation extends to Aristotle who, according to Agamben (2016: 200), “in no 
way defi nes what life is: he limits himself to dividing it thanks to the isolation of the nutritive 
function, in order then to rearticulate it into a series of distinct and correlative potentials or 
faculties (nutrition, sensation, thought). [...] What has been separated and divided off  (in this 
case, nutritive life) is precisely what permits one to construct the unity of life as a hierarchical 
articulation of a series of faculties and functional oppositions, whose ultimate meaning is not 
only psychological by immediately political.”
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reduces human beings to a non-human state of life – a state that no longer allows 
any political freedom.
 In contrast to Arendt, however, Agamben searches for an ahistorical or trans-
historical structure of biopolitics. The transhistoricity of his argument can clearly 
be seen in the manner he conceptualizes “Western politics” according to the 
binary opposition of bare life/political life (see Blencowe 2010). Although he does 
acknowledge that “modern democracy presents itself from the beginning as a 
vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly trying to transform its 
own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the bios of zoē” (Agamben 
1998: 13), he nevertheless finds already the Greek division to be biopolitical, 
allowing for the capture of bare life into politics. For Agamben, biopolitics is not 
so much a modern invention, but an ahistorical structure of Western politics as a 
whole: “It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original 
activity of sovereign power” (Agamben 1998: 11, original italics). This ‘biopolitical 
body’ is analysed through the figure of homo sacer6  – originally a concept in 
Roman law7 –, someone who is abandoned from the protection of law and who can 
be killed with impunity. With respect to the homo sacer, “all men act as sovereigns” 
(Agamben 1998: 53). The biopolitical body is one that is reduced to bare life and 
rendered killable. Understanding the whole of Western politics as based on the 
structure of inclusive exclusion, Agamben can conclude that its fundamental 
and originary function is desubjectification and objectification of human beings 
through the separation of bare life from political life. There are, of course, 
significant problems with this kind of formal and structural conceptualization of 
politics. In the words of Thomas Lemke (2005), it is, for example, simultaneously 
too general and too narrow in the sense that it effaces significant insights into 
technologies of power and, at the same time, reduces politics to one specific 
structure (see also Coleman, Grove 2008). Katia Genel (2006) provides a similar 
critique, stating that Agamben’s view reduces all of politics to the decision over the 
value of life. 
Arendt and Agamben: Biopolitics as totalized power
Both Arendt and Agamben underscore the dehumanizing and desubjectifying 
aspects of biopolitics, stressing that the politicization of life, in fact, makes political 
action impossible. For Arendt, human beings are normalized and condemned to 
6 Homo sacer is another concept posited by Agamben as transcending history, enabling us to 
interrogate the present (see Fiskesjö 2012).
7 On the meaning of homo sacer, see also Fowler 1911.
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mere reproductive behaviour; for Agamben, they are objectified and rendered 
killable. Both are prone to totalizing visions of power: Arendt “writes about the 
social as if an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate 
from us, had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorbing, and ultimately 
destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots 
that mechanically serve its purposes” (Pitkin 2000: 4); Agamben (2016: Part III) 
tells us that the only way to escape the hold of biopolitics is to rethink the concepts 
of politics and life altogether. 
 Thus, both conceptualize biopolitics along the lines of total subjection, 
stripping human beings of the capacity for (self-)construction. Once the biological 
body enters politics, the latter can no longer be conceptualized as politics. In this 
way, both Arendt and Agamben seem to perpetuate the idea that “true” politics 
can only be practised by and among “minds”, otherwise it is already perverted into 
an inhuman quasi-politics. Both Arendt (1998) and Agamben (2000: 3–14; 2016: 
214–219) speak of ‘thought’, ‘contemplation’ and ‘intellect’ when conceptualizing 
the potentiality for political freedom, thus making it seemingly impossible to 
think of freedom from the perspective of the body, or in other words, from the 
perspective of that which is politicized in the first place.
 Now, when biopolitics is conceptualized as total subjection, the only way to 
think resistance and freedom that remains is that of escaping from it altogether. 
For Agamben, who equates Western politics with biopolitics, this task is made 
all the more difficult since political freedom has to take the form of escaping the 
millennia-old tradition of politics as a whole. He does this by attempting to get rid 
of the notion of subjectivity, since, as he explains, “if power relations necessarily 
refer to a subject,” the “ungovernable” cannot be thought based on this concept 
(Agamben 2016: 108). The concept Agamben coins for conceptualizing an escape 
from biopolitical sovereignty is the ‘form-of-life’, a life that cannot be separated 
from its form, that is, cannot be divided into zoē and bios, into an excluded ground 
and a politically qualified life. In The Coming Community, published before Homo 
Sacer, Agamben (2007[1990]) already uses a similar concept to the form-of-life, 
then called ‘whatever being’. ‘Whatever’ does not signify it does not matter which, 
but that a being described by this term always matters (Agamben 2007[1990]: 
1). The form-of-life, or the whatever being, then, is always itself, and never 
(re)presents anything other than itself, its own potentiality. While attempting to 
get rid of the notion of subjectivity, Agamben veers alarmingly close to a sort of 
radical individualism by essentially saying – every way or form of life matters in 
its very style of being. In the words of Sergei Prozorov (2017), Agamben’s means 
of thinking of freedom and resistance result in a ‘democratic biopolitics’ which has 
rendered sovereign biopolitics inoperative.
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 What risks getting lost in this juxtaposition of a totalized sovereign power and 
a life that always matters is, however, the dimension of power. And with losing 
sight of power, we are also at risk of losing sight of politics. For what politics can 
we speak of if the form of association of living beings is simply a communication 
without interaction and conflict, a form of association which merely lets beings 
be as they are in themselves, as they go about their business in whatever form? 
The result of Agamben’s strategy of thinking freedom and resistance without 
subjectivity might very well lead to a vision of an apolitical politics8 in which 
every form-of-life is, paradoxically, again, its own sovereign in that they can be 
whatever they prefer to be – or prefer not to. It must be said, however, that the 
term ‘individuality’ does not suit Agamben’s thought very comfortably, at least in 
its traditional sense of an individual human being with a (relatively) fixed identity. 
Nevertheless, if the term is taken literally as something that cannot be divided, 
then a ‘form-of-life’ cannot be anything other than an individual.9
 In the following, I will attempt to think of freedom and resistance in the 
context of biopolitics without trying to escape relations of power. Instead, it 
would be necessary, especially if biopolitics is to be a useful concept for a semiotic 
perspective on society and politics, to maintain that power is not a totalized 
structure of subjection and that resistance is to be thought of within the context 
of power relations, not radically outside them. This argument entails the view of 
subjectivity that is necessarily always something other than itself – conditioned 
and, to an extent, constituted within power relations –, while at the same time 
still exercising the (potentially political) freedom of self-construction. Thus, we 
cannot oppose an integral ‘form-of-life’ to a totalized power as if they were outside 
each other. To explain this further, let us move to the concepts of dispositive and 
umwelt.
8 As Stefano Franchi (2004: 38) says, Agamben’s political thought can very easily become a 
thought of the “impossibility of politics”. 
9 To explain the “stylistics” of forms-of-life, Agamben constructs a novel ontological perspec-
tive – modal ontology, “the ontology of the how” (Agamben 2016: 231) that does not divide 
being into Being and beings, but only concerns the ways in which beings exist. By concentrating 
on the how, Agamben moves from questioning identity to habits, thus his ontology can be 
called non-identifi cational. Consequently, he also shift s the meaning of the term ‘individual’ 
(although, of course, he refrains from using it himself), which can now signifi y, for example, 
a gesture, a (bad or good) habit... essentially precisely whatever, since individuality can no 
longer be conceptualized as a stable identity. It is now an entirely contingent event without a 
transcendental dimension according to which it could be carved into properties, characteristics, 
etc. In this sense it is precisely pertinent to speak of radical individualism, because forms-of-
life are contingent events defi ned in their own immanence (see Agamben 1999: 220–233).
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Biopolitics as politics: Disposing the umwelt
Now, without denying that the introduction of life into politics can be destructive 
of subjectivity (in the sense of objectifying some human beings as non-humans) 
and deadly,10 it would nevertheless be necessary to conceptualize biopolitics in 
terms of how Foucault (1982: 790) has understood government – the structuration 
of “the possible field of action of others”. The word ‘possible’ is the key here, 
since it leaves open the possibility of freedom in the context of power relations, a 
possibility of resistance: 
[W]hat defi nes a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does 
not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: 
an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the 
present or the future. [...] a power relationship can only be articulated on the 
basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power 
relationship: that “the other” [...] be thoroughly recognized and maintained to 
the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a 
whole fi eld of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions may open up. 
(Foucault 1982: 789)
Thus, biopolitical government exhibits what Frederick Dolan (2005) has called 
the “paradoxical liberty of bio-power”: if the human being is cut up, classified, 
captured into dispositives of power in ways involving biological processes and 
bodily characteristics, this is not necessarily a reduction, but simultaneously an 
opportunity to construct social relations and subjects along new trajectories: “the 
spread of this mode of ‘government’ tends to increase opportunities for political 
action that takes the form of questioning, contesting, and resisting the status quo” 
(Dolan 2005: 373). 
 Foucault takes a different approach to biopolitics than Arendt and Agamben. 
Where Arendt saw total normalization of behaviour and Agamben a totalized 
structure of sovereign violence, the Foucauldian perspective stresses that power 
should not be viewed as a totality, but itself contingent and in constant change. 
10 Despite focussing on the productive aspects of biopower, Foucault does acknowledge that 
the sovereign right to kill has not disappeared, but in the context of biopolitics must be justifi ed 
on the basis of protecting life instead. In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault (2003a: 256) 
discusses the link of productive biopolitics and deadly sovereignty from the perspective of 
racism, saying that if “the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to 
kill, it must become racist”. Th e politics of death (thanatopolitics) is, thus, the other side of the 
politics of life. 
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 It is here that the concept of the dispositive11 becomes important. Foucault 
uses this concept in order to move beyond a discursive analysis of knowledge 
to a conceptualization of power as a productive process. It could be said that 
the dispositive is inseparably tied to biopolitics, because Foucault used it in 
reference to, among others, the prison where individual bodies are subjected to 
power (Foucault 1991[1975]), psychiatric power where the category of abnormal 
individuals is constructed (Foucault 2003b; 2006), and sexuality which is a crucial 
site of the government of populations (Foucault 1978). The reference to biopolitics 
is also stressed by an interpretation of the concept by Agamben (2009: 13): “I wish 
to propose to you nothing less than a general and massive partitioning of beings 
into two large groups or classes: on the one hand, living beings (or substances), 
and on the other, apparatuses in which living beings are incessantly captured”. 
Thus, the dispositive is that network of power relations in which humans as living 
beings are captured.
 It is important to note that the dispositive could contain absolutely anything; 
it is not confined to language, but also entails materiality; it is not confined to 
human actions, but also has as an important component non-human agency:12 
the dispositive is a network of heterogeneous elements defined by the nature of 
relations between these elements (Foucault 1980: 194–195). How can the nature of 
these relations be determined? According to Foucault, the dispositive always has a 
strategic aspect; that is, the elements related are deployed to some specific ends; it 
always “has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to 
an urgent need” (Foucault 1980: 195, original emphasis). Thus, dispositives cannot 
be generalized into transcendent and total structures of power, they are historical 
and contingent, they are constantly (re)invented and (re)produced. Furthermore, 
there can be no single dispositive governing all sociopolitical elements. In any 
given society, there is always a multiplicity of dispositives all with their specific 
forms of (normalized) subjectivity. To resist, to form a subjectivity – or a form of 
life – not previously described and determined within a dispositive does not, then, 
11 Th e French word for the concept is ‘dispositif’, which is commonly translated as ‘apparatus’ 
and sometimes also as ‘deployment’. Here I use the term ‘dispositive’ throughout for reasons 
similar to those articulated in Bussolini 2010 and Raff nsøe et al. 2014 – namely that this term 
has a wider scope and refers to the logic of a network of relations, while ‘apparatus’ is more 
closely related either to technology in the narrow sense or to ‘state apparatuses’ in Althusser’s 
(1971) sense. 
12 In Maurizio Lazzarato’s words: “Machines, objects (and signs), act in precisely the same way 
as an “action upon action” [...]. Th is must not be understood merely as a relation of one human 
being with another. Non-humans contribute just as humans do to defi ning the framework 
and conditions of action. One always acts within an assemblage, a collective, where machines, 
objects, and signs are at the same time “agents”” (Lazzarato 2014: 30).
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require a flight from a grand biopolitical dispositive, but can be conceptualized 
along the lines of active subjectification in the context of multiple dispositives. 
That is, active subjectification – self-construction – is that which enables us to 
speak of a biopolitics – and it does not matter if subjectification is not free from 
biological concerns. Subjectification can be political in all of its aspects, whether 
bodily or “rational” – as long as it has the potential to reconfigure the strategic 
determination of relations between elements.
 Now, subjectivity is a product and construct of dispositives of power, and 
insofar as subjectivity is one of the defining dimensions of dispositives (Deleuze 
2006), the latter is primarily a useful analytical concept for understanding the 
social control and modification of behaviour and self-construction (Raffnsøe 
2008). It is also helpful for conceptualizing biopolitics in more semiotic terms – 
and not as simply modifying or practicing violence over life – as a semiotically 
mediating and mediated power. In the words of André Berten (1999: 42), 
“Dispositives are a way of understanding human being’s natural or constructed 
environment not as a space of knowledge acquisition and transmission, but as a 
network that mediates knowledge [...]”. If we think of humans as living beings, then 
it is necessary to note that they always subjectify themselves in an environment 
that also acts upon them and has already normalized the ways in which they can 
become social subjects. To become a subject that knows always already entails 
assuming, at least to a certain extent, of a subject position that is known. 
 Now, to take seriously the notion of dispositive as a network of heterogeneous 
elements would necessitate moving beyond “linguistic imperialism” in social 
semiotics (McDonald 2013), or in other words, not to model political subjectivity 
on the basis of linguistic-symbolic speech only. We would do well to get rid of 
the attitude, voiced by George Herbert Mead (1972[1934]: 136), that the “ability 
to experience different parts of the body is not different from the experience of 
a table”. This perspective implies a relation of ownership of the self over its body, 
the former commonly understood as reflexive and the latter as simple “material” 
on which the self is built. This results in the conceptualization of a semiotic self to 
which the body matters only insofar as it makes the former possible, while the self 
is symbolically constituted (e.g., Wiley 1994). 
 However, what do Uexküll and his concept of the umwelt have to do with any of 
this? It is my proposal that the object of biopolitical government be conceptualized 
not as “life itself ”  – which is extremely vague and indeterminate –, but as an 
umwelt. That is, dispositives of power act as historical conditions of possibility for 
the construction of social subjectivity. Umwelt, a subjectively meaningful universe 
(Uexküll 1957[1934]; 1982[1940]), an environment delimited by the network of 
subjective semiotic relations, cannot be thought of outside dispositives. 
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 Uexküll resisted the mechanicist perspective on life and living beings (see 
Brentari 2015: 47–54), stating, for example, that it would be deceptive to “concede 
to a mechanist, and not a biologist, the right to limit the study of the reality of all 
living organisms to the law of the Conservation of Energy” (Uexküll 1982[1940]: 
26). For him, “Behaviors are not mere movements or tropisms [...]; they are not 
mechanically regulated, but meaningfully organized” (Uexküll 1982[1940]: 26). 
Uexküll saw that meaning-making is characteristic of all living beings and in this 
sense his theoretical biology is fundamentally egalitarian: all living beings should 
be seen as creators of meaning not reducible to simple mechanical reflexes and 
reactions: “Depending upon its nature, the simplest reflex is a perception–effect 
operation, even if its arc only consists of a chain of individual nerve cells” (Uexküll 
1982[1940]: 34). His view that even the simplest reflex is of a semiotic nature – it 
presupposes the conferring of meaning upon that which is reacted to – leads him 
to postulate that even the simplest living beings possess an umwelt: “We are forced 
to attribute an Umwelt, however limited, to the free-living fungus-cells, an Umwelt 
common to each of them, in which bacteria contrast with their surroundings, 
as meaning-carriers, as food and, in doing so, are perceived and acted upon” 
(Uexküll 1982[1940]: 35). Extended in this manner, meaning-making becomes the 
foundational process of biology, but not meaning-making in an abstract sense, but 
specifically tied to the subject and the process of subjectification: the Uexküllian 
umwelt emphasizes the role of the subject in the construction and constitution of 
its very own specific universe; life assumes the form of subjectification.
 However, in attempting to provide subjectification in an umwelt with a political 
dimension, we run into a difficulty. Uexküll understood behaviour in an umwelt 
according to the concept of ‘building-plan’ (Bauplan) (1982[1940]: 30) – living 
beings behave according to a fixed and unchangeable structure. Uexküll, thus, 
can be seen as a “fixist” (see Brentari 2015: 114). This aspect is criticized by 
Agamben in his book The Open (2004) in which he interprets the concept of the 
umwelt as reducing the living being to its functions. Agamben reads Uexküll’s 
famous account of the tick’s umwelt as stating that the being of the tick is the 
relationship between the three elements that enable its movement: the butyric 
acid, the temperature of 37 degrees, and the skin of mammals (Agamben 2004: 
47). There seems to be no escape from an umwelt that is fixed and determined. 
Characteristically, Agamben proposes that it is necessary to envision a living being 
“without a world”, without an umwelt, in order to think of any sort of freedom. 
He relies on Martin Heidegger’s concept of ‘profound boredom’ in order to argue 
for a cut, a rupture in the relationship between the living being and its world: 
the possibility of not being tied down to a world in which one would simply be 
defined by its functions. There is no space here to go into a detailed account of this 
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interpretation; suffice it to simply underscore the opposition it creates: on the one 
side, we have the umwelt which defines living beings according to the functioning, 
and on the other, the ‘profoundly bored’ living being capable of being cut off from 
its environment, and thus capable of true self-creation apart from its immediate 
surroundings.
 This is, perhaps, a false opposition, because it is not at all certain that we need to 
think of a radical cut from the umwelt in order to think of freedom (of behaviour, 
meaning-making, action, etc.).13 In Frederik Stjernfelt’s terms, in order to think 
outside the “perfect fit” between the organism and umwelt, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the existence of neutral objects, that is, objects not yet given meaning, 
in the umwelt (Stjernfelt 2007: 261). Without the existence of neutral objects, no 
learning, no modification of behaviour would be possible. This perspective enables 
us to understand that the possibility of learning and thus semiotic freedom also 
open up the living being – the body as a “semiotic device” (Stjernfelt 2007: 261) – 
to normalizing power, biopolitics. Why? If the living being and the umwelt were 
connected in a “perfect fit”, it would not be possible to modify this relation, to 
introduce into the umwelt subjects and objects as potentially significant for the living 
being. If we assume the existence of neutral objects, umwelt becomes open: it can 
be modified by the subject who simultaneously modifies its own behaviour – its 
own subjectivity.14 Thus, the “governed” of biopolitical normalization is necessarily 
a “normative” (on this notion, see Canguilhem 1991[1966]) living being, capable of 
constructing and creating its own norms.
 When biopolitics, thus, takes the “life” of humans-as-living-beings as its object, 
it is not to be understood in a way that biopolitical government renders human 
beings incapable of social meaning-making. With the concept of the umwelt, it is 
possible to show that the process of life inevitably involves a normative dimension 
in subjectification. According to this reading, it is not necessary to postulate that 
“life itself ” is capable of resisting biopolitical dispositives: resistance and freedom is 
exercised by living beings as subjects, and not as an anonymous vital process. And, 
perhaps paradoxically, it is this semiotic freedom to modify behaviour – change 
the nature of semiotic relations and resignify objects – that enables something like 
13 In addition, thinking of self-construction in terms of a radical cut from a living being’s 
umwelt would very easily lead to a postulation of a sort of disembodied creature of thought 
who would be capable of simply thinking itself free. In order to conceptualize a biopolitical 
subjectivity, this is not, however, a fruitful path, since it tends to reproduce the mind vs. body 
dichotomy in which the former governs over the latter and in which the mind, consequently, 
assumes the determining role.
14 On the openness of umwelt, see also Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the concept 
in La nature (1995[1968]).
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biopolitics (that is, the government of biological and bodily aspects of individuals) 
to capture living beings in dispositives in the first place: normativity makes 
normalization possible, but the latter should not be seen as erasing normativity, but 
instead as constantly reacting to the creation of norms by living beings (see Mills 
2013). Dispositive, thus, is not to be understood as a coherent and total structure, but 
as Philippe Verhaegen (1999: 112) says, a “techno-semiotic bricolage”: a mixture of 
human and non-human agencies acting upon the actions of subjects, and modifying 
and constructing their umwelt in the process. 
 While the Uexküllian umwelt emphasizes the role of the subject in the con-
struction and constitution of its very own specific universe; life assumes the form of 
subjectivation, thus enabling us to cast aside the vague notion of “life itself ” which 
is too readily reducible to “bare life”. The dispositive stresses that the constitution of 
a subjective universe is always a political activity interwoven with power relations 
and objectifications of subjectivity. Whenever the social umwelt is analysed, it is not 
enough to stress the subjective construction of meanings. Complementing umwelt 
theory with the concept of the dispositive allows us to consider that the elements 
and relations that become meaningful for the subject are not neutral, but embedded 
in power relations. Reverting the perspective and conceptualizing the dispositive 
in terms of the umwelt, allows us to notice the active participation of individuals 
as living beings – and not as predominantly “rational” or speaking beings, when 
analysing social mechanisms of subjectification. 
A semiotic perspective on biopolitics
Instead of opposing oppressive biopolitics and a resistant life, it would thus be 
more useful to conceptualize biopolitics in terms of subjectification. Especially 
because we would thus be more attuned to the manners in which human ways of 
life are always politically charged, and not heroically opposed to politics – the latter 
perspective, as said above, tending to fall back onto an opposition between totalized 
mechanisms of power and radical individualism. Furthermore, if we oppose life and 
politics, we run into the risk of conceptualizing a ‘life itself ’ which should not be 
politicized – the consequence here is that we would tend to interpret any sort of 
introduction of bodily and biological aspects into political strategies as a sort of 
perverted politics, not properly human politics.15 Political semiotics has taught us 
15 Th at political freedom of action cannot be thought alongside biopolitics, is not limited 
to Arendt and Agamben, but is present, too, in most theorists concerned with emancipatory 
politics. Alain Badiou, for example, in his book Ethics (2001), clearly opposes mere life-as-
survival to subjectivation according to fi delity to an event (see also Puumeister 2018a); Jacques 
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that nothing is political in and of itself; anything, however, can become political 
once it is constituted as an element in the public sphere (Selg, Ventsel 2008). As 
also Foucault has put it: although inherently “nothing is political, everything can 
be politicized, everything may become political. Politics is no more or less than that 
which is born with resistance to governmentality [...]” (cited in Senellart 2007: 390). 
This perspective precludes any a priori delimitation of the private and the public (as 
in Arendt’s case: the good life is public and sheer life private). Instead, the very limits 
between the public and the private are the result of political struggle.
 Thus, if the biological and bodily aspects of human life are evidently sites of 
political struggle and confrontation, it would not make sense to state that they 
cannot be introduced into politics without the latter becoming reduced to a 
nonhuman quasi-politics. What should be done, then, with such processes that 
Paul Rabinow (1996) has termed ‘biosocialities’  – the construction of social 
subjects and communities with reference to a specific, often pathological, 
biological issue? Denying the political nature of struggles based on bio-aspects 
would amount to stripping certain subjects of their social meaning-making 
potentiality. A denial of the political nature of these subjectification processes 
can only spring from the paradigm of humanist politics, that is, from that which 
understands politics based on language, speech, reason (logos). When biopolitics 
is understood as taking as its governed subject not life itself, but instead the 
subjective umwelt, it is possible to conceptualize an image of biopolitics that does 
not reduce life to a mere cog in the biopolitical machine. In short, the biosemiotic 
understanding of life as subjectification (the ongoing construction of an umwelt 
by the organism) enables us to understand the vital process itself in an almost 
political sense: to live means to constantly interpret and negotiate one’s subjectivity 
in relation to an environment and to other living beings. To live means constantly 
to choose between simultaneously present alternatives – in short, to make meaning 
(Kull 2015). The mechanism of choice underlying semiosis is a precondition for 
freedom of action and cannot be limited to human rational action. Insofar as 
meaning-making is the activity of life, the latter cannot be conceptualized along 
the lines of blind obedience to laws; as opposed to obeying physical laws, the 
formation of habits based on rules is a creative activity (Hoffmeyer 2008; Kull 
2014; Emmeche, Kull 2011). If biopolitics is understood to be normalizing, it first 
and foremost works on constructing habitual behaviour in dispositives of power. 
Normalization does not, thus, eliminate freedom of choice, although it no doubt 
Rancière (2010), for his part, has opposed politics to biopolitics, the latter being a simple 
process of control over bodies. Biopolitics is seen as an activity of administration, classifi cation, 
management, control, etc. that has nothing to do with freedom of action.
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constitutes some forms of behaviour as more natural or even as “innate” (e.g., in 
the form of “sexual drives” (Davidson 1987). This does not mean, however, that 
political action becomes impossible – the potentiality for semiosis remains (e.g., 
the emancipatory politics of sexuality constituting the latter as a sociopolitical 
rather than a “natural” or “innate” phenomenon).
 The political nature of human life becomes especially clear when we do not draw 
a strict line between the natural and the social or political in the modern sense 
as conceptualized by Bruno Latour (1993): the ‘natural’ as operating according 
to laws and the ‘social’ as the domain of meaning-making. The challenge, when 
con ceptualizing a semiotic understanding of biopolitics, is exactly to understand 
the bodily aspects and practices as thoroughly semiotic, that is, as an important 
part of the public exercising of politics. That is, political subjectivity should not 
be understood according to the concept of the human person, which implies a 
separation between the rational (speaking) part of the human being and the passio-
nal (bodily) part (see Esposito 2012; 2015). This perspective would still put us in the 
position of differentiating between the social and the natural – and would neces-
sitate that we speak of biopolitics as mere power over the non-semiotic aspects of 
life. The biosemiotic approach, to the contrary, enables us to view the body itself as 
actively making meaning (see Stjernfelt 2007; Violi 2008) and thus constitutive of 
subjectivity.16
 The view of life as a process of meaning-making and modelling (interpretation) 
has two significant consequences for conceptualizing freedom in biopolitics: firstly, 
life is never “sheer” or “bare” life,17 but always already a particular perspective under-
going subjectification; and secondly, that which can be conceptualized as resisting 
power is not “life in general” or “life itself ”, but an activity of meaning-making, a 
construction of a particular mode of life. Potentially, thus, any form or mode of life 
is political or, in other words, always constructing for itself a world of action and 
interaction via meaning-making processes. And it would not be sensible to try and 
attempt to limit human politics simply to the activity of speech and reason, since in 
this way political analysis would remain blind to an abundance of phenomena and 
processes obviously significant to the constitution of the political sphere. Taking a 
semiotic perspective on biopolitics thus has the potential to develop an image of 
biopolitics as posthuman politics – instead of understanding the politicization of 
human life as precluding political freedom. This would require that we take the body 
seriously in its political aspects, and not subordinate it to the individual person. This 
task remains to be tackled in future research.
16 We have previously argued for the necessity to rethink political subjectivity in biosemiotic 
terms in Puumeister, Ventsel 2018, taking into account the Peircean typology of signs as icons, 
indexes, and symbols.
17 See also Abbott 2012.
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In place of a conclusion: 
Some problems concerning our interpretation
Proposing that biopolitics operates through semiotic mediation on the subjective 
umwelt and thus is productive of subjectivity creates some problems that require 
further qualification of what we mean by biopolitics. The principal novelty of the 
concept of biopolitics is that it articulates the way in which biological life becomes 
a part of the political process, the latter having previously been understood to be a 
matter of communication, reason, speech, etc. Now, if we focus on subjectification, 
will this not reduce the novelty and smooth out the break that the perspective 
of biopolitics introduced into political theory? What does it mean to say that 
subjectification is, precisely, biopolitical? Which type of politics does not affect 
the umwelt of humans-as-living beings? Does not any type of politics construct 
its own subjects? 
 The answer to the latter question is, of course, affirmative. Which is why it is 
necessary seriously to limit the scope of the term biopolitics. I have previously 
proposed (Puumeister 2016; 2018b) that biopolitics should be understood in the 
context of specifically normalizing dispositives. More precisely, this means that 
biopolitics should be understood as constructing ways of being and forms of life 
that are inherently normalizable: the primary operation of biopolitics is thus to 
construct abnormality. This means that certain social ways of being are seen as 
in need of correction and modification, but also of control and management in 
order that they would conform to the set norms in the future. Now, the principal 
normalizing technique is the subjects’ internalization of the norms for social 
ways of being. In this way, it is possible to speak of biopolitical self-government: 
one has to normalize one’s being in such a way as to become an acceptable and 
recognizable social subject. Biopolitics works, then, on the very being of subjects 
by constructing normalized ways of being in an environment. It does not work on 
social relations in the strict sense – as in group relations, hierarchies, etc. –, but 
instead on the body as a normative “semiotic device”.
 Limiting biopolitics to normalizing techniques of power will no doubt take 
away some of the concept’s novelty and grandeur. It is no longer possible to speak 
of a total event of modernity through which all politics could be analysed and 
theorized. However, setting some limits is inevitable in order for the concept to 
attain its analytical specificity.18
18 Acknowledgements. Th is research was supported by the University of Tartu ASTRA 
Project PER ASPERA, fi nanced by the European Regional Development Fund, and the 
Estonian Research Council grant PRG314.
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Биополитическая субъективация
Статья предлагает семиотическую интерпретацию понятия биополитики. Вместо по-
литики, которая берет “самое жизнь” в качестве своего объекта и в результате отделяет 
жизнь как объект от субъектов, биополитика понимается как субъективация – правящая 
рациональность, которая конструирует социальные способы бытия и формы жизни, 
то есть социальные субъективности. Аргументация строится на основе двух понятий: 
умвельт Якоба фон Икскюля и диспозитив Мишеля Фуко. Если первое позволяет 
показать, что процесс жизни может осмысливаться как субъективация, то второе 
позволяет трактовать биополитику как беспрерывную конструкцию нормализованной 
и нормализирующей социальной среды. В конце статьи делается вывод о том, что то, чем 
биополитика управляет, можно осмыслить как субъективный умвельт, а не в качестве 
объективной «самой жизни».
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Biopoliitiline subjektistamine
Artikli eesmärk on tuua kokku biopoliitika teooria ja semiootika. Sel otstarbel tuleb ümber 
mõelda, mis õigupoolest on biopoliitilise valitsemise objektiks ehk valitsetavaks. Selle asemel 
et käsitleda viimast ‘elu enese’ mõiste abil – mis on liiga ähmane ning mida kasutades hakkab 
biopoliitika tähistama sellist võimu, mis justkui eraldaks elu ja subjektid –, pakub artikkel 
välja keskendumise subjektistamistele ja subjektsusele. Argument esitatakse kahe mõiste abil. 
Esiteks, Michel Foucault’ töödest lähtuv dispositiiv, mis võimaldab mõista biopoliitikat pideva 
normaliseeritud ja normaliseeriva sotsiaalse keskkonna konstrueerimisena. Teiseks, Jakob 
von Uexkülli omailm, mille abil on võimalik näidata, et elamine tähendab pidevat subjektiks 
saamist. Lõpuks jõutakse välja tõdemuseni, et biopoliitika ‘valitsetavat’ saab mõtestada subjek-
tiivse omailmana – mitte aga objektiivse ‘elu endana’.
